Pre-World War II
Back in the early 1930s, Japan faced a major economic crisis within it’s country. Because of the rapid growth of its population and the limitation of necessitated of large food imports due to the outgrowing exponantially anti-Japanese racism movements from the western countries, Japan’s reign boosting its military capabilities throughout the years and significantly increased its fluential and power and thus rises its status as one of the major global Super Power in term of military prowess just behind the U.S.S.R (Soviet Union) and the U.S.A (United States of America).
In the following years, Japan’s party government started to weakened after receiving a mass amount of political issues from internally and externally. The economic and racial arguments was later added the military’s distrust of party government. The U.S Washington Conference had allowed a smaller ratio of naval strength than what was the navy desired, while the Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1930 had accepted the London Naval Conference’s limits on heavy warship cruisers over military objections. Back in 1925 Katō Takaaki had to split the army into four divisions. Many military men had objected to the restraint shown by Japan toward the Chinese Nationalists’ northern expedition of 1926 and 1927 and wanted Japan to take a harder line in China. Under the jurisdiction of Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi from the Seiyūkai cabinet in which reversed earlier policy by intervening in Shantung in 1927 and 1928. But Tanaka was replaced by Hamaguchi in 1929, and under his cabinet’s rule the policy of moderation was restored. The army and its supporters felt that such vacillation earned Japan ill will and boycotts in China without gaining any advantages.
After the agression conflict of Manchuria back in the September 1931, Japan steadily preparing itself in order to empower its military capability to contest against the U.S.A. In the following succession, each advances by the military extremists gained them new concessions from the moderate elements in the government and brought greater foreign hostility and distrust. Rather than oppose the military, the government agreed to reconstitute Manchuria as an “independent” state, Manchukuo. The last Manchu emperor of China, P’u-i, was declared regent and later enthroned as emperor in 1934. Actual control lay with the Kwantung Army, however; all key positions were held by Japanese, with surface authority vested in cooperative Chinese and Manchu. A League of Nations committee recommended in October 1932 that Japanese troops be withdrawn, Chinese sovereignty restored, and a large measure of autonomy granted to Manchuria. The League called upon member states to withhold recognition from the new puppet state. Japan’s response was to formally withdraw from the world body in 1933. Thereafter, Japan poured technicians and capital into Manchukuo, exploiting its rich resources to establish the base for the heavy-industry complex that was to undergird its “new order” in East Asia.
In northern China, boundary areas were consolidated in order to enlarge Japan’s economic sphere. In early 1932 the Japanese navy precipitated an incident at Shanghai in order to end a boycott of Japanese goods; but Japan was not yet prepared to challenge other powers for control of central China, and a League of Nations commission arranged terms for a withdrawal. However, by the 1934, Japan had made itself clear that it would brook no interference in its China policy and that Chinese attempts to procure technical or military assistance elsewhere would bring Japanese opposition. Not long after the military revolt occured in Tokyo, Februari 1936, the finance minister of Takahashi Korekiyo was assassinated, which was led by the kidnap of Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek in the Sian Incident in December 1936, and this misfortune leads to an anti-Japanese united front by Nationalists and Communists. Soon later, the domestic politics revealed, moreover, that the Japanese people were not yet prepared to renounce their parliamentary system. In the spring of 1937, general elections showed startling gains for the new Social Mass (or Social Masses) Party (Shakai Taishūtō), which received 36 out of 466 seats, and a heavy majority of the remainder went to the Seiyūkai and Minseitō, which had combined forces against the government and its policies. The time seemed ready for new efforts by civilian leaders, but in the field the armies preempted them.
On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops engaged Chinese units at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, leading to warfare between China and Japan. Japanese armies took Nanking, Han-k’ou (Hankow), and Canton despite vigorous Chinese resistance; Nanking was brutally pillaged by Japanese troops. To the north, Inner Mongolia and China’s northern provinces were invaded. On discovering that the Nationalist government, which had retreated up the Yangtze to Chungking, refused to compromise, the Japanese installed a more cooperative regime at Nanking in 1940.
In November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and later with Italy. This was replaced by the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which recognized Japan as the leader of a new order in Asia; Japan, Germany, and Italy agreed to assist each other if they were attacked by any additional power not yet at war with them. The intended target was the United States, since the Soviets and Nazis had already signed a nonaggression pact in 1939, and the Soviets were invited to join the new agreement later in 1940.
Japanese relations with the Soviet Union were considerably less cordial than those with Germany. The Soviets consented, however, to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to the South Manchurian Railway in 1935, thereby strengthening Manchukuo. In 1937 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with China, and in 1938 and 1939 Soviet and Japanese armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. But in April 1941 a neutrality pact was signed with the Soviet Union, with Germany acting as intermediary.
Japanese-German ties were never close or effective. Both parties were limited in their cooperation by distance, distrust, and claims of racial superiority. The Japanese were uninformed about Nazi plans for attacking the Soviet Union, and the Germans were not told of Japan’s plans to attack Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Nor, despite formal statements of rapport, did Japan’s state structure approach the totalitarianism of the Nazis. A national-mobilization law (1938) gave the Konoe government sweeping economic and political powers, and in 1940, under the second Konoe cabinet, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established to merge the political parties into one central organization; yet, the institutional structure of the Meiji constitution was never altered, and the wartime governments never achieved full control over interservice competition. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association failed to mobilize all segments of national life around a leader. The emperor remained a symbol, albeit an increasingly military one, and no führer could compete without endangering the national polity. Wartime social and economic thought retained important vestiges of an agrarianism and familism that were in essence premodern rather than totalitarian.
Japan’s relations with the democratic powers deteriorated steadily. The United States and Great Britain did what they could to assist the Chinese Nationalist cause. The Burma Road into southern China permitted the transport of minimal supplies to Nationalist forces. Constant Japanese efforts to close this route led to further tensions between Great Britain and Japan. Anti-Japanese feeling strengthened in the United States, especially after the sinking of a U.S. gunboat in the Yangtze River in 1937. In 1939 U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull renounced the 1911 treaty of commerce with Japan, and thus embargoes became possible in 1940. President Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to rally public opinion against aggressors included efforts to stop Japan, but, even after war broke out in Europe in 1939, American public opinion rejected involvement abroad.
The Start of World War II
The European war presented the Japanese with tempting opportunities. After the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941, the Japanese were torn between German urgings to join the war against the Soviets and their natural inclination to seek richer prizes from the European colonial territories to the south. In 1940 Japan occupied northern Indochina in an attempt to block access to supplies for the Chinese Nationalists, and in July 1941 it announced a joint protectorate with Vichy France over the whole colony. This opened the way for further moves into Southeast Asia.
The United States reacted to the occupation of Indochina by freezing Japanese assets and embargoing oil. The Japanese now faced the choices of either withdrawing from Indochina, and possibly China, or seizing the sources of oil production in the Dutch East Indies. Negotiations with Washington were initiated by the second Konoe cabinet. Konoe was willing to withdraw from Indochina, and he sought a personal meeting with Roosevelt, hoping that any U.S. concessions or favors would strengthen his hand against the military. But the State Department refused to agree to such a meeting without prior Japanese concessions. Having failed in his negotiations, Konoe resigned in October 1941 and was immediately succeeded by his war minister, General Tōjō Hideki. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hull rejected Japan’s “final offer”: Japan would withdraw from Indochina after China had come to terms in return for U.S. promises to resume oil shipments, cease aid to China, and unfreeze Japanese assets. With Japan’s decision for war made, the negotiators received instructions to continue to negotiate, but preparations for the opening strike against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor were already in motion. Japan’s war aims were to establish a “new order in East Asia,” built on a “coprosperity” concept that placed Japan at the center of an economic bloc consisting of Manchuria, Korea, and North China that would draw on the raw materials of the rich colonies of Southeast Asia, while inspiring these to friendship and alliance by destroying their previous masters. In practice, “East Asia for the Asiatics,” the slogan that headed the campaign, came to mean “East Asia for Japan.”
The attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7 [December 8 in Japan], 1941) achieved complete surprise and success. It also unified American opinion and determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion. The Japanese had expected that, once they fortified their new holdings, a reconquest would be so expensive in lives and treasure that it would discourage the “soft” democracies. Instead, the U.S. fleet was rebuilt with astonishing speed, and the chain of defenses was breached before the riches of the newly conquered territories could be effectively tapped by Japan.
The first years of the war brought Japan great success. In the Philippines, Japanese troops occupied Manila in January 1942, although Corregidor held out until May; Singapore fell in February, and the Dutch East Indies and Rangoon (Burma) in early March. The Allies had difficulty maintaining communications with Australia, and British naval losses promised the Japanese navy further freedom of action. Tōjō grew in confidence and popularity and began to style himself somewhat in the manner of a fascist leader. But the U.S. Navy had not been permanently driven from the South Pacific. The Battle of Midway in June 1942 cost the Japanese fleet four aircraft carriers and many seasoned pilots, and the battle for Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons ended with Japanese withdrawal in February 1943.
After Midway, Japanese naval leaders secretly concluded that Japan’s outlook for victory was poor. When the fall of Saipan in July 1944 brought U.S. bombers within range of Tokyo, the Tōjō cabinet was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso formed a supreme war-direction council designed to link the cabinet and the high command. Many in government realized that the war was lost, but none had a program for ending the war that was acceptable to the military. There were also grave problems in breaking the news to the Japanese people, who had been told only of victories. Great firebombing raids in 1945 brought destruction to every major city except the old capital of Kyōto; but the generals were bent on continuing the war, confident that a major victory or protracted battle would help gain honorable terms. The Allied talk of unconditional surrender provided a good excuse to continue the fight.
In February 1945 the emperor met with a group of senior statesmen to discuss steps that might be taken. When U.S. landings were made on Okinawa in April, the Koiso government fell. The problem of the new premier, Admiral Suzuki Kantarō, was not whether to end the war but how best to do it. The first plan advanced was to ask the Soviet Union, which was still at peace with Japan, to intercede with the Allies. The Soviet government had agreed, however, to enter the war; consequently, its reply was delayed while Soviet leaders participated in the Potsdam Conference in July. The Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26 offered the first ray of hope with its statement that Japan would not be “enslaved as a race, nor destroyed as a nation.”
Atomic bombs largely destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war and the next day marched into Manchuria, where the Kwantung Army could offer only token resistance. The Japanese government attempted to gain as its sole condition for surrender a qualification for the preservation of the imperial institution; after the Allies agreed to respect the will of the Japanese people, the emperor insisted on surrender. The Pacific war came to an end on August 14 (August 15 in Japan). The formal surrender was signed on September 2 in Tokyo Bay aboard the battleship USS Missouri.
Post-World War II
From 1945 to 1952 Japan was under Allied military occupation, headed by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), a position held by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur until 1951. Although nominally directed by a multinational Far Eastern Commission in Washington, D.C., and an Allied Council in Tokyo—which included the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the Commonwealth countries—the occupation was almost entirely an American affair. While MacArthur developed a large General Headquarters in Tokyo to carry out occupation policy, supported by local “military government” teams, Japan, unlike Germany, was not governed directly by foreign troops. Instead, SCAP relied on the Japanese government and its organs, particularly the bureaucracy, to carry out its directives.
The occupation, like the Taika Reform of the 7th century and the Meiji Restoration 80 years earlier, represented a period of rapid social and institutional change that was based on the borrowing and incorporation of foreign models. General principles for the proposed governance of Japan had been spelled out in the Potsdam Declaration and elucidated in U.S. government policy statements drawn up and forwarded to MacArthur in August 1945. The essence of these policies was simple and straightforward: the demilitarization of Japan, so that it would not again become a danger to peace; democratization, meaning that, while no particular form of government would be forced upon the Japanese, efforts would be made to develop a political system under which individual rights would be guaranteed and protected; and the establishment of an economy that could adequately support a peaceful and democratic Japan.
MacArthur himself shared the vision of a demilitarized and democratic Japan and was well suited to the task at hand. An administrator of considerable skill, he possessed elements of leadership and charisma that appealed to the defeated Japanese. Brooking neither domestic nor foreign interference, MacArthur enthusiastically set about creating a new Japan. He encouraged an environment in which new forces could and did rise, and, where his reforms corresponded to trends already established in Japanese society, they played a vital role in Japan’s recovery as a free and independent nation.
In the early months of the occupation, SCAP acted swiftly to remove the principal supports of the militarist state. The armed forces were demobilized and millions of Japanese troops and civilians abroad repatriated. The empire was disbanded. State Shintō was disestablished, and nationalist organizations were abolished and their members removed from important posts. Japan’s armament industries were dismantled. The Home Ministry with its prewar powers over the police and local government was abolished; the police force was decentralized and its extensive power revoked. The Education Ministry’s sweeping powers over education were curtailed, and compulsory courses on ethics (shūshin) were eliminated. All individuals prominent in wartime organizations and politics, including commissioned officers of the armed services and all high executives of the principal industrial firms, were removed from their positions. An international tribunal was established to conduct war crimes trials, and seven men, including the wartime prime minister Tōjō, were convicted and hanged; another 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment.
The most important reform carried out by the occupation was the establishment of a new constitution. In 1945 SCAP made it clear to Japanese government leaders that revision of the Meiji constitution should receive their highest priority. When Japanese efforts to write a new document proved inadequate, MacArthur’s government section prepared its own draft and presented it to the Japanese government as a basis for further deliberations. Endorsed by the emperor, this document was placed before the first postwar Diet in April 1946. It was formally promulgated on November 3 and went into effect on May 3th, 1947.
From 1952 to 1973 Japan experienced accelerated economic growth and social change. By 1952 Japan had at last regained its prewar industrial output. Thereafter, the economy expanded at unprecedented rates. At the same time, economic development and industrialization supported the emergence of a mass consumer society. Large numbers of Japanese who had previously resided in villages became urbanized; Tokyo, whose population stood at about three million in 1945, reached some nine million by 1970. Initial close ties to the United States fostered by the Mutual Security Treaty gave way to occasional tensions over American policies toward Vietnam, China, and exchange rates. The first trade frictions, over Japanese textile exports, took place at that time. Meanwhile, foreign culture, as was the case in the 1920s, greatly influenced young urban dwellers, who in the postwar period broke with their own traditions and turned increasingly to Hollywood and American popular culture for alternatives. Japan’s new international image was projected and enhanced by events such as the highly successful 1964 Olympic Summer Games and the Ōsaka World Exposition of 1970.
Japan’s role and military status in the international world during the Heisei era (1989–2019) were shaped by its post-WWII pacifist constitution, economic prowess, and evolving regional security challenges. The period saw Japan adapt its foreign and defense policies in response to changing global dynamics, especially in relation to the United States, neighboring countries in East Asia, and emerging global security issues.
After World War II, Japan adopted a pacifist constitution (Article 9) that renounced war and prohibited maintaining military forces for combat purposes. However, in response to regional threats, Japan maintained a Self-Defense Force (SDF), which was strictly limited to defense and peacekeeping operations. Despite this constitutional constraint, Japan’s military capacity, including advanced technology and significant defense spending, positioned the SDF as one of the most capable military forces in the region, albeit with a defensive mandate.
Throughout the Heisei era, Japan’s relationship with the United States remained a cornerstone of its defense and foreign policy. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, committed both nations to mutual defense. This alliance was crucial for Japan’s security, as it provided a deterrent against regional threats, notably from China, North Korea, and Russia. U.S. military bases in Japan, particularly Okinawa, played a significant role in maintaining regional stability.
- 1990s: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a shift in global security dynamics. Japan increasingly relied on the U.S. to ensure regional stability, particularly as the U.S. maintained a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.
- 2000s: Japan supported U.S.-led military operations, such as the Gulf War (1991) and the Iraq War (2003), despite the pacifist constraints. Japan sent logistical support and non-combat personnel, which marked a shift toward a more active role in international security.
Japan’s primary security concerns in the Heisei era were North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, China’s growing military assertiveness, and territorial disputes with both China and Russia.
- North Korea: The 1990s and 2000s saw rising tensions with North Korea, particularly due to the latter’s missile tests and nuclear program. Japan sought to strengthen its defense capabilities and cooperated closely with the United States to counter this threat. Japan also implemented economic sanctions and pushed for a strong international response to North Korea’s provocations.
- China: The rise of China as a regional and global power was a defining feature of the Heisei era. Japan was wary of China’s military expansion, particularly its naval buildup in the East China Sea. The territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China) was a source of tension throughout the era. Japan increased its defense spending and sought to strengthen security ties with other regional powers, including Australia and India, as a counterbalance to China.
- Russia: Although relations with Russia were less tense than with China or North Korea, Japan and Russia continued to dispute the sovereignty of the Kuril Islands, which Japan calls the Northern Territories. This issue prevented the signing of a peace treaty following World War II.
While Japan’s military remained strictly defensive for most of the Heisei era, the country began gradually expanding its security role on the global stage.
- 1990s: Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions grew. In 1992, Japan passed the International Peace Cooperation Law, which allowed the deployment of Japanese personnel for peacekeeping operations. Japan sent peacekeepers to Cambodia, East Timor, and other conflict zones, marking a shift toward a more active international role in peacekeeping.
- Post-9/11 Era: The September 11 attacks in 2001 had a profound impact on Japan’s security policies. Japan passed laws that allowed the SDF to support the U.S. in the War on Terror. Japanese forces were deployed to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support to U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although these deployments were largely non-combat, they were significant in terms of Japan’s increasingly global military engagement.
- 2010s: The rise of regional threats, particularly from North Korea and China, led Japan to further revise its defense policies. In 2015, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan passed controversial security laws that allowed the SDF to engage in collective security actions, including collective defense with allies such as the U.S. These laws expanded Japan’s role in international security and represented a significant shift from its pacifist stance.
Japan consistently maintained a large defense budget, ranking among the top countries in the world in terms of military expenditure. Japan invested heavily in advanced military technology, including missile defense systems, submarines, and fighter jets. The country also developed a ballistic missile defense system, including Aegis destroyers and land-based systems, to counter regional missile threats, particularly from North Korea.
Japan remained a key player in international diplomacy during the Heisei era, leveraging its economic influence to contribute to global development and peacekeeping efforts. Japan played an active role in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the G7, and worked to support global economic stability and the rule of law in international relations. Japan’s contributions to global humanitarian aid and development assistance also bolstered its international standing.
After entering the Shōwa era. Japan has once again rise its status as global economic and military power, despite being limited in some ways due to its loss in World War II and has had partial of its right stripped by the convenant signed by back in 2 September 1945. In the recent years up until now, Japan still keeps on growing both its economical and military strength in the global.
Source: Japanese history: Postwar, The History of Japan’s Postwar Constitution | Council on Foreign Relations, Japan’s World and World War II | Diplomatic History | Oxford Academic, Planning for War: Elite Staff Officers in the Imperial Japanese Army and the Road to World War II – The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Japan as a Global Military Power, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations – Office of the Historian, Japan’s Military Evolution from Meiji to WWII, Japan and The Second World War: The Aftermath of Imperialism, Japan – Post-WWII, Economy, Culture | Britannica